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THE EVOLUTION OF A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
RELATIONSHIP IN PUBLIC EDUCATION:
NEW YORK CITY'S CHANGING
SEVEN-YEAR HISTORY
Ida Klaus*
I.

EARLY FORCES

bargaining relationship between the New York City Board
of Education and its teachers had its roots in the social
forces of the mid-fifties and its formal origins in the events of the
early sixties. The relationship came about without benefit of law or
executive policy. No law permitting public employees to bargain collectively was in effect anywhere in those years, and Mayor Wagner's
1958 Executive Order-the culmination of three years of study and
public inquiry-did not apply to teachers.1 Instead, the impetus
came directly from the persistent and increasingly powerful drive of
the teachers themselves. They demanded a substantial voice
in the determination of their salaries and, through improvement
of their working conditions, enhancement of their stature as professionals. Ignoring the prohibitions of state law, they chose the strike
as their pressure technique. 2 Two work stoppages3 in the 1959-60

T

HE

• Director of Staff Relations, New York City Board of Education. A.B. 1927, Hunter
College; L.L.B. 1931, Columbia University.-Ed.
I. Executive Order on City Employee Relations (March 1958). This order covers
only those city employees who were under the direct control of the Mayor. It established for those employees a system of labor relations similar in many fundamental
respects to that prevailing under federal and state law for private workers. Although
Board of Education employees were not among those who would be covered by the
Mayor's program, two organizations representing New York City teachers nevertheless
participated in the public hearings which led to the adoption of the order. The one,
representing only high school teachers and since defunct, stressed the separate professional, rather than trade-union, interest of teachers. The other, since merged into
the present dominant United Federation of Teachers, expressed the hope that the
hearings would point the way to effective collective bargaining for all nonsupervisory
pedagogical employees in a single unit. See I. Klaus, Report on a Program of Labor
Relations for New York City Employees (New York City Department of Labor, June
1957).
2. The so-called Condon-Wadlin Law, Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y.
Laws 842, as amended, Law of April 23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed
1967), adopted in 1947 as a part of the Civil Service Law, banned all strikes by public
employees and imposed severe penalties upon individual workers for engaging in the
proscribed conduct. The Governor's message accompanying his approval of the
measure declared the philosophy underlying the legislation to be that the public service, in all its aspects, is "a public trust in behalf of all the people" and that "a
trustee cannot strike or falter in the performance of his duties."
3. The first strike, which lasted for about three and a half weeks in February
1959, was limited to evening high school teachers who sought an increase in their
rates of pay.
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period signaled three important facts: (1) that the teachers were
grimly serious about obtaining improvements in their welfare; (2)
that they were strongly determined to achieve those improvements
through collective bargaining by a duly chosen representative; and
(3) that they would not tolerate further vague promises and tactical
delays by the City Board of Education.
A. Basic Attitudes and First Steps

In 1961, a newly constituted and appointed New York City
School Board gave highest priority to meeting the teachers' requests.
Within a few months, the new Board had declared a clear policy of
exclusive recognition for collective bargaining purposes; had implemented that policy by formal hearing and election procedures;
had overcome earlier obstacles to determining appropriate bargaining units, voting eligiblity requirements, and qualifications for organization part1c1pation; and had recognized the employees'
majority choice, the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, 4 as the exclusive bargaining representative of all classroom teachers. 5
The second strike was called on November 7, 1960, by the American Federation of
Teachers affiliate and predecessor of the present United Federation of Teachers. It
sought to obtain for the teachers' representatives some form of recognition in dealing
with the Board on salaries and on the improvement of working conditions. The strike
was terminated after one day when a three-man panel of prominent labor leaders was
appointed to inquire into the basic causes of the strike and the areas of teacher dissatisfaction. Thereafter, the panel was to make recommendations for the improvement
of teacher-Board relations. The panel recommended a policy and program for the recognition and participation of teacher organizations. For months thereafter, the Board
refused to declare and implement an unequivocal policy. Instead, it sought by various
means to ascertain preliminarily the sentiments of its teachers and other pedagogical
employees. Finally, in June 1961, it formulated a proposed policy for collective bargain•
ing founded upon exclusive recognition of a bargaining agent chosen by the
majority of employees. The policy was to become operative, however, only if it
were established in a referendum that a majority of employees actually wished
to have collective bargaining. Over 70 per cent of those participating in the preliminary referendum voted in favor of collective bargaining as defined by the Board.
See 1962-1963 Agreement Between The Board of Education of the City of New York
and United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Covering Classroom Teachers (signed
Oct. 18, 1962) (a copy of this agreement is on file with the Michigan Law Review).
4. This organization is referred to hereinafter as the Union, the United Federation
of Teachers, or the UFT.
5. The Board members turned the resolution of the representation question and
all related matters over to the City Department of Labor. The two most difficult
issues which had blocked a rational and expeditious application of the new policy in
favor of exclusive recognition were the designation of an appropriate unit and the
qualification of contending organizations to represent employees for bargaining. A
system-wide unit of classroom teachers was found most conducive to the prompt and
effective institution of collective bargaining. Contending organizations were deemed
qualified if they met three basic tests: (1) nondiscriminatory admission to member•
ship; (2) capacity to act as a collective bargaining representative for all employees
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Then, early in 1962, the Board of Education and the Union took
the first steps toward establishing what is now probably the most
advanced and critical collective bargaining relationship anywhere
in public education, if not in the public service generally. The relationship-and especially the collective bargaining agreements by
which it has been governed-have served as the model for school
districts and other teacher groups. 6 Most teacher-board agreements
in other large cities which are executed as the result of negotiations are plainly molded in the image of the basic New York City
parent agreement.7
The New York City relationship was founded as much on the
solid commitment of the Board of Education to the conceptual and
practical responsibilities of collective bargaining as it was on the firm
dedication of the teacher leadership to the correspondingly full harvest of substantive and procedural advantages which collective bargaining was expected to bring. Thus, each side entered upon this
novel joint endeavor with its own understanding of how both would
work together to fashion a new employee-relations "constitution" to
govern the special public enterprise of which they were a part. It is
hard to say whether either party foresaw at that time how the dynamics of the continuing relationship and the shadows already cast
by oncoming social changes would expand the framework of the
"constitution" and foster the emergence of a solid "common law" of
the enterprise.
Trial, conflict, and combat-resolved in the end by a basic determination on both sides to make the joint venture work-have
involved; and (3) capacity and disposition to represent equally all within the unit.
A mail-ballot election among the then approximately 40,000 teachers in the unit re•
suited in a majority vote for the United Federation of Teachers as against two other
organizations and a "none" choice. For a more detailed account of the technical aspects of the resolution of the preliminary issues, see 1963 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERI·
CAN BAR AssocIAnON, SEcnON OF LABOR RELATIONS LAw, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON LAw OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE REI.AnoNS.
6. Upon the conclusion of the second agreement in 1963, the American Federation of
Teachers prepared and distributed in other areas of the country a special bulletin entitled
Collective Bargaining for Teachers-the New York City Contract. The bulletin
pointed out the highlights of the new agreement and noted: "Teachers everywhere
are studying the contract in expectation of future advancement in their own school
districts."
7. The model has been followed by both American Federation of Teachers and
National Education Association affiliates. See, e.g., contracts in Detroit, Boston, Philadelphia (all American Federation of Teachers affiliates) and Newark, New Jersey, and
New Haven, Connecticut (the former a National Education Association constituent
and the latter a National Education Association constituent for a time). While the
substance of the New York City agreement has not yet been borrowed by other
countries, a possible first known step in that direction has been taken in Japan where
one of the early New York agreements has been translated into Japanese.
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marked the seven-year history of the relationship and shaped the
characteristics it has assumed in the process of continuing growth
and cautious adjustment. For the teachers, this seven-year history has
been a story of how from the beginning they won important psychic
and economic gains, and found new professional freedoms and security. For the Union, it has been a series of encounters in the teachers'
behalf along the road to tremendous power in the administration of
the school system. For the Board and the administrators, it has been
an account of how they met new challenges to established concepts
and practices in the governance of the schools, and how they reshaped attitudes in the conduct of their relations with teachers. For
the community, it has provided not merely a perennial source of
anxiety about whether and when the schools would open, but also
an impetus toward asserting its own separate interests in the outcome of the bargaining.

B. The Growing Process and the Stages of Evolution
The teacher-board relationship developed through three distinct
but interrelated processes: (I) joint negotiation at the bargaining
table by which the basic terms and conditions of teacher service are
determined and then reduced to a written collective bargaining agreement; (2) actual day-to-day application and administration at the
school (and other) levels of the terms and conditions agreed upon;
and (3) active consultation between appropriate representatives of
both sides on matters of mutual concern which are either not
properly within the scope of collective bargaining, or are not susceptible to appropriate adjustment at the bargaining table, or should
not be deferred for consideration until the opening of formal periodic
negotiations. This Article deals primarily with the first process. But
where important, it also attempts to show the interaction of all three.
The New York City Board of Education has negotiated four
classroom teacher agreements: 8 the first in 1962,9 for a one-year term
commencing July 1, 1962; the second in 1963,10 for a two-year term
beginning on July 1, 1963; the third in 1965, covering a two-year
8. In addition to the agreements covering classroom teachers, the AFL-CIO has
also entered into agreements with the board covering school secretaries, psychologists
and social workers, laboratory assistants and laboratory technicians, day school counselors and per session counselors, auxiliary teachers (bi-lingual teachers), and attendance teachers.
9. 1962-1963 Agreement, supra note 3.
10. 1963-1965 Agreement Between The Board of Education of the City of New
York and United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Covering Classroom Teachers
(signed Feb. 10, 1964) (a copy of this agreement is on file with the Michigan Law
Review).
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period starting on July 1, 1965;11 and the fourth and current one12
for a twenty-six-month period commencing July l, 1967, and ending
with the beginning of the next school year in September 1969. Each
agreement has built upon and expanded its predecessor. Each agreement, and the negotiations from which it emerged, marks a distinct
and progressive stage in the evolution of the Board-Union relationship. As original documentary sources, the four agreements themselves provide much internal evidence of the organic growth of the
relationship. However, the agreements alone do not reflect the complete history out of which they arose. The form, the style, and the
content of these documents have their origins in external surrounding circumstances which serve to illuminate the writings and, hence,
the relationship itself.
II. THE

FmsT STAGE: EXPLORATION AND EXPERIMENTATION

The first stage in the relationship, which commenced early in
1962, consisted of the initial encounter between School Board and
Union, the course of the negotiations benveen them, and the emergence of the first agreement. Although far from amateurs, both the
Board as employer and the Union as agent for the teachers entered
upon their respective responsibilities in a relatively simple and comparatively primitive way. Almost immediately after a formal ceremony in which the Board officially recognized the Union's status as
the exclusive bargaining representative for all of New York's then
43,000 public school teachers, the UFT presented some 160 demands
to the Superintendent of Schools. At that point, the Board was faced
with the hard realities of translating into practice the theory of its
new policy. What were the basic mechanics and the guiding substantive principles for the initiation and conduct of a bargaining relationship in public education? Other spheres of public employment
offered little, if any, guidance. It was a matter of breaking new
ground-as much for the Union as for the Board. A number of Board
members were well acquainted with the process and the institution
of collective bargaining in the world of industry. The UFT, indeed,
drew considerable advice and assistance from the trade union move11. 1965-1967 Agreement Between The Board of Education of the City of New
York and the United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Covering Day School, Classroom Teachers and Per Session Teachers (signed Nov. 24, 1965) (a copy of this agreement is on file with the Michigan Law Review).
12. 1967-1969 Agreement Between The Board of Education of the City of New
York and United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Covering Day School, Classroom
Teachers and Per Session Teachers (signed Dec. 6, 1967) (a copy of this agreement is
on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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ment of which it was a part. Hence, both sides set about adapting
established private-sector concepts to the peculiar characteristics of
this special public enterprise; the process of accommodation was a
pragmatic one of informed improvisation. On the Board's side, the
heaviest burden fell first on the Superintendent and then on the
nine Board members, all of whom became personally involved in the
negotiations.
The most important issue was, of course, salary. On this subject,
Board members met with the Union committee far into the night
in numerous negotiating sessions. A significant difference between
government and private industry brought on an early disagreement about the timing of the salary negotiations in relation to
the budget-making process.13 The final allocation of funds to the
Board for the next fiscal year had not yet been made when the negotiations began. The Board nevertheless felt that it could proceed to
discuss salaries and other monetary items within the framework of
realistic estimates of future income based on experience. The Union
disagreed. It regarded negotiations under circumstances short of fiscal certainty as a mere game which gave little promise that the chips
would ever be cashed in. Nevertheless, the bargaining on salaries
proceeded, moving into high gear after the Mayor advised the Board
of its operating budget for the following school year. The Union
thereupon insisted on a substantial upward revision of the salary
schedules, and the Board offered what it felt it could afford to
pay within the limitations of its budget and of anticipated additional funds. The stalemate brought on a one-day strike that closed
most New York City schools. The Union terminated the work stoppage in obedience to a court injunction and decision which declared
the strike illegal under the state's so-called Condon-Wadlin Law. 14
Following the strike, the parties agreed on a very favorable salary
structure after the Governor discovered that he could make additional state funds available to the Board for that year.15
Other teacher demands for long-awaited improvements in working conditions presented the challenge of how to accommodate col13. For a discussion of this and other aspects of the special problems connected
with public sector bargaining, see Address by Ida Klaus, The Emerging Relationship,
Conference on Public Employment and Collective Bargaining, University of Chicago,
Feb. 5, 1965. See also Rehmus, Constraints on Local Government and Public Employee
Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 919 (1969).
14. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of
April 23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967). This was the only occasion on which the Union was to heed a court directive forbidding a strike.
15. The Union, which claimed credit for unearthing the Governor's cache, evinced
an early talent for the game of the political treasure hunt in public employment
negotiations.
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lective bargaining to the Board's internal budget-making responsibility. That responsibility required the Board, once monies were
made available to it for the ensuing fiscal year, to adopt its own internal operating budget for the year by allocating specific funds
for designated school-system purposes. Among other important
benefits, the Union sought during the first year of bargaining a reduced teaching schedule for teachers in the elementary and junior
high schools, relief from unpleasant custodial and monitorial tasks
known as "nonteaching chores," and a daily duty-free lunch period
in the elementary schools. The Board acknowledged both the need
for these changes and its willingness to bring them about. The problem was how to accomplish those objectives through the new mechanism of collective bargaining and at a cost which the Board could
afford. The solution agreed upon was that both parties would jointly
assume the burden of internal budgetary allotments within the limits
of existing funds. The parties thus proceeded to negotiate a schedule
of the amounts of money which the Board would spend on each desired improvement. The scheduled amounts agreed upon as well as
the new salary terms were embodied as separate budget items in a
formal Board resolution adopted in June 1962, just before the commencement of the next fiscal year. The resolution authorized the
expenditure of stated sums of money for specified purposes to accomplish nine types of improvement in teacher working conditions.
Three examples will illustrate how the parties subsequently translated the jointly negotiated budget into teacher benefits in the collective bargaining agreement: (1) the budget authorized the sum of
523,276 dollars to hire 116 additional teachers in order to accomplish
a "Reduction of Teacher Instructional Load" in certain kinds of
junior high schools from twenty-five to twenty-three or twenty-four
periods per week; 16 (2) it authorized the sum of 1,903,000 dollars to
hire school aides in the elementary and high schools and, on a
limited basis, in the junior high schools, "[t]o perform other than
teaching chores now carried out by instructional staff"; 17 and (3) it
authorized the sum of 1,831,466 dollars to hire 406 elementary school
teachers in specialized areas in order "to make time available for
relief of the classroom teacher, one ... period per week." 18 When
the parties drew up the first contract in September, they incorporated
the items already specified in the budget resolution for the improvement of working conditions into the collective bargaining agree16. See 1962-1963 Agreement, supra note 3, art. IV,
17. See id., art. IV, § A(3).
18. See id., art. IV, § A(2).

§

A(l).
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ment as teacher benefits tied in amount to the budgetary allotments
made in the resolution. For example: the collective bargaining agreement provided for the reduction of teaching periods in certain junior
high schools "to the extent permitted by" the June budget allotment
for that purpose.19 Similarly, the Board undertook in the agreement
to grant relief from nonteaching chores through implementation of
"the budgetary item as to school aides" authorizing the hiring of
nonteaching personnel to perform those tasks. 2° Finally, the obligation to grant preparation periods in the elementary schools was tied
to the amount of money made available in "the budgetary item as
to increased specialized service."21 In this way the parties negotiated
from knowledge of the amount of money available, and the Board
was not committed to promoting improvements beyond its budgetary
capacity. However, each individual teacher had no assurance of any
specific benefit.
Another aspect of the first bargaining experience was the formulation of a grievance procedure. The parties agreed upon a very detailed procedure which ended, for all grievances based on the application or interpretation of the "working conditions" terms of the
contract, with a carefully prescribed recourse to final arbitration by
a neutral outsider chosen by both sides. Arbitration of this kind was
at that time a bold and pioneer experiment in government; 22 both
sides were aware that they were breaking new ground. The Board
was ready to defend the arbitration provision against the possible
attack of illegal delegation of its authority. In return, it sought and
obtained from the Union the inclusion of a broad no-strike clause in
the agreement.23 The Union hailed the grievance procedure as the
most significant aspect of the new relationship. 24 It assured its mem19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
On the

IV, § B(2)(b).
IV, § B(!l)(c).
IV, § B(3)(b).
status of arbitration in government employment as of that time, see

NEW YoRK CrrY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNRESOLVED DISPUTES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
(1955); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL
SERVICE, A POLICY FOR EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE

18-19, 22-23 (1961).
23. The provision, entitled "No-Strike Pledge," reads as follows:
The Union and the Board recognize that strikes and other forms of work stoppages by teachers are contrary to law and public policy. The Union and the
Board subscribe to the principle that differences shall be resolved by peaceful
and appropriate means without interruption of the school program. The Union
therefore agrees that there shall be no strikes, work stoppages, or other concerted
refusal to perform work, by the employees covered by this agreement, nor any
instigation thereof.
1962-1963 Agreement, supra note !l, art. XIV.
24. The October 1962 monthly bulletin of the United Federation of Teachers,
UNITED AcrxoN, reported to its members:
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bers, however, that "we have not renounced our right to take whatever action we deem to be the most effective in support of the negotiations for a new contract when this contract expires."25
Upon completion of the negotiations, all items of agreement
were brought together into a single document in the form and style
of a collective bargaining agreement26 covering thirty-eight printed
pages. On October 18, 1962, the Union and the Board formally
signed the agreement27-the first document of its kind in the history
of public education. The Union framed the signed agreement and
hung it on its headquarters wall to commemorate the genesis of the
bargaining relationship and perhaps to symbolize the solemnity of its
pledge to its members that "[f]rom this time on, a Union contract
will be a condition and the basis under which we perform our professional duties and set our professional standards."28

III.

THE SECOND STAGE: CRISIS AND TURNING POINT

Negotiations for the second agreement started earnestly in January of 1963, about three months after the first agreement had been
signed. The Union submitted salary proposals and demands for further improvements in working conditions and changes in established
practice.
The first-round problems of accommodating the changes in working conditions to the Board's budget-making authority and financial
ability assumed different proportions in the second stage. The negotiations were now looking toward an agreement for a two-year term.
The Union, moreover, was asking for definite commitments on salaries and working conditions in each year-without conditioning
their extent on the availability of funds. In other words, the teachers
now wished to negotiate directly for improvements in their welfare.
They wanted the substance of change and were leaving the financial
means and budgetary consequences to the Board's ingenuity. As a
result, the Board not only had to anticipate the amount of operating
funds it might receive for the second year, but it was also faced with
the necessity of obligating those future undetermined funds. Ability
to pay thus remained a fundamental factor in the Board's negotiating
The Grievance Procedure is the heart of the union contract. To most teachers,
the effectiveness of the United Federation of Teachers will be judged by its
ability to settle grievances. The grievance procedure reflects, more clearly than
anything else, the great change made since the day when the Board made all the
decisions; when the teacher was strictly at the mercy and whim of his principal.
25. United Federation of Teachers, UNITED TEACHER, Oct. 1962.
26. 1962-1963 Agreement, supra note 3.
27. The contract was for a term of one year, retroactive to July 1, 1962.
28. United Federation of Teachers, UNITED TEACHER, Oct. 1962.
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position. For example, on the question of additional nonteaching and
preparation periods, the dispute centered on the Board's ability to
provide a definite number of such periods. In the end, the parties
reached a compromise: for the first year of the agreement the Board
would provide the elementary school teachers with a specific number
of preparation periods "to the extent possible" ;29 however, for the
second year of the agreement the teachers had an outright guarantee
of a given number of periods which was subject to the grievance
procedure.30 In the junior high schools, the Board promised a definite
number of periods during the first year and a further limited increase in the second year "to the extent that funds are made available."81
Although the parties remained far apart on the matter of salaries
until the eleventh hour, they did not face the same tactical problems
of synchronization with the budget-making process as they had met
the year before. In order to obtain a two-year contract and to absorb
most of the increased salary costs in the second year, the Board was
prepared to take its chances that its estimates of future financial
ability were accurate. If necessary, it would have to divert to salaries
and other negotiated items funds that would otherwise be utilized
for other educational needs and services.32 The result was a shift in
the order of priorities.33
The main field of conflict during the second year concerned an
extremely grave and difficult area in public education: the proper
scope and boundaries of collective bargaining. Where is the line between what is primarily within the sphere of working conditions
and hence subject to negotiation and bilateral decision, and what
is essentially within the realm of educational policy and hence
within the exclusive authority of the Board or the Superintendent
29. 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10, art. IV, § A(3)(b).
30. Id.
31. Id. art. IV, § A(2)(b).
32. See Rehmus, supra note 13.
33. The :Board in fact negotiated with the Union the order of priorities for the
disbursement of the moneys that would be made available to the Board in its budget
for the second year of the agreement. The arrangement read as follows:
:BASIC FORMULATION OF SALARY INCREASE POLICY
Expense budget funds made available to the :Board for the 1964-65 fiscal year will
be allocated in the following order: First, funds will be allotted to continue programs and activities at the level in operation during 1963-64. Second, funds will
be allotted for salary increases for the bargaining unit as stipulated in this agree•
ment, and twice this amount will be allotted for derivative costs and increases as
determined by the :Board and for other educational improvements. Third, any
residual funds will then be allotted in the same proportion as provided in the
preceding sentence.
In the application of residual funds to teacher salary schedules priority will be
given to equalizing steps and to increasing the promotional differential and then
the first and second differentials.
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and not subject to negotiation and agreement?34 The Union sought
to extend collective bargaining to new aspects of educational administration, and the Board rejoined that such matters were reserved
exclusively to the discretionary professional judgment and policymaking authority of the Board and of the Superintendent. The
stalemate hardened on three principal issues.
The first area of concern was the assignment of teachers to
special classes and duties. The Union contended that all teachers
should be presumed to be equally qualified for assignment to classes
for the intellectually gifted and to certain special nonteaching positions (such as student guidance or counseling) carrying a lighter
teaching load. It further maintained that the school's principal
should have no discretion to make teacher selections on the basis of
his judgment of relative qualifications; instead, assignments should
be made only in accordance with seniority. To this, the Board answered that qualifications were indeed relevant, and that their determination was within the exclusive domain of the principal. The
Union replied that qualifications for special assignments should be
negotiated and included in the agreement.
Second, there was considerable debate about class size. The
Union insisted on a commitment as to maximum class size based not
on what was a reasonable working condition for teachers but rather
on what produced the best learning conditions for children. That
judgment, the Board maintained, was one of educational policy which
was committed to the sole discretion of the Board and could not be
negotiated.
Third, the crucial question of improvement of "difficult" schools
34. The issue was similar to, although the legal implications were different from,
that presented by a proposal for a "management rights" clause in private industry
negotiations. The first agreement between the Board and the teachers contained no
so-called "management rights" clause. However, the area left open by law to the
Board for negotiations had been indicated as follows by the Board in the preliminary
referendum on collective bargaining conducted by the Board on June 12, 1961:
Various governmental agencies have in recent years·voluntarily adopted modified forms of collective bargaining for government employees. These, because of
the legal limitations and responsibilities placed upon governmental bodies, necessarily differ in certain essential respects from industrial collective bargaining.
In the case of the Board of Education, we are advised by counsel that such
limitations would, under the present State laws, include the following:
(a) As to certain subjects such as, for example, matters relating to hours,
working conditions, holidays, vacations and allocation of funds within the total
appropriated, the Board is advised that it has substantial powers. As to others,
its powers are limited, particularly those calling for the appropriation of public
funds, since it may make only recommendations of the total amount believed
necessary for budgetary purposes.
(b) As to those areas which, under law, are removed from the Board of Education's power, the Board of Education may commit itself to recommending any
agreed action to the appropriate public agencies.
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was raised. Late in the course of the negotiations, the Union submitted as a basis for negotiation and agreement a plan for the "effective" organization and administration of schools in low-income areas.
The plan called for experimental educational policies and instructional programs. Component features of the proposal included the
selection of teachers, principals, and superintendents "with the advice
and consent" of the Union, and joint faculty-supervisor administration of the pilot schools. The Superintendent of Schools charged
publicly that the Union was attempting to take over the administration of the schools, and he refused even to discuss the matter
with the Union.
The clash over these issues led to the first serious breakdown in
the teacher-Board relationship. Threats of strike were heard once
more. This time the Union's leadership warned that, like freedom
riders and other civil rights protesters, they would defy what they
regarded as an unconstitutional state law prohibiting strikes by
public employees.35 The seriousness of these issues to both sides derived in large part from the Union's insistence that the desired
changes be written into the collective bargaining agreement under
the section on teacher "working conditions." In this way the changes
would be subject to the full scope of the grievance procedure, including arbitration. For the Board, this meant compounding its delegation of authority to make educational policy-first, to the Union
in the agreement, and then, possibly, to a third-party outsider. The
Board was willing to enter into discussions with the Union on the
questions of qualifications for teacher assignments and class size, but
it reserved the right to make its own policy decisions on these subjects. The Board did offer, however, to incorporate its final policy
determinations in a superintendent's circular to be distributed to all
the schools. Complaints of arbitrary departure from the policy
prescribed in this circular would then be subject to the agency steps
of the grievance procedure, but not to arbitration.36
With the aid of a mediation panel, the Board and the Union fi35. The reference was to the modified Condon-Wadlin Law, passed in the 1963
session of the State Legislature and to remain in effect until July I, 1965. Law of
April 23, 1963, ch. 702, §§ I, 2, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432, amending Law of March 27,
1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842 (repealed 1967). The principal changes made were
a reduction in the tenure and promotion forfeitures imposed on individual employees
for striking, the imposition of monetary fines for striking, and the strengthening of
enforcement procedures.
36. The term "grievance" was defined to cover two types of complaints: (I) "a violation, misinterpretation or inequitable application of any of the provisions of this
agreement"; or (2) unfair or inequitable treatment "by reason of any act or condi•
tion which is contrary to established policy or practice governing or affecting employees." 1965-1967 Agreement, supra note 11, art. VII, § A (emphasis added). Only
the first type of complaint was subject to arbitration.
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nally resolved the foregoing issues on the eve of the opening of
school. The parties negotiated those elements of the basic demands
which primarily concerned teacher working conditions and included
them in the collective bargaining agreement. For example, the Board
conceded that a class might be so large as to constitute an undue
physical burden on a teacher. In that sense, class size could be regarded as a "working condition" subject to negotiation to determine
the maximum number of pupils which a teacher could reasonably
be required to handle.37 Since class-size limitations became part of the
working conditions section of the contract, any claimed departure
from those limitations was subject to all phases of the grievance procedure, including arbitration. On the other hand, teacher assignments
and qualifications for assignments remained within the discretion of
the school principals. Still, the parties devised special procedures to
promote £air and objective selection of teachers for coveted nonteaching assignments carrying a lower teaching load. Under these
provisions, seniority was to be the controlling £actor only where
qualifications, as determined by the principal, were equal. In order
to preserve its discretionary and policy-making authority, the Board
insisted that teacher programs and assignments be covered in a
separate article of the contract entitled "Statement of Policy." This
special article expressly provided that its provisions were deemed to
be a part of "established policy and practice" within the meaning of
the definition of "grievance."38 This meant that complaints of
arbitrary or discriminatory application of the policy were subject to
the agency steps of the grievance procedure-but not to arbitration.
On questions of teacher recruitment and the improvement of difficult schools-essentially matters of school administration and educational policy-the Union ultimately demanded a medium for expressing the views of the majority of teachers, even if not through
the normal channels of collective bargaining. The critical stalemate
over that issue was resolved when the Board agreed to establish a system of periodic joint consultation-not negotiation-be37. For a description of the Union's strategy on its class-size negotiations and the
meaning it placed upon the final outcome by the then director of organization for
the United Federation of Teachers, see Selden, Class Size and the New York Contract,
PHI DELTA KAPPAN, March 1964, at 283.
38. The Statement of Policy contained the following introduction:
Following discussions with the Union, the Board, exercising its authority under
the Education Law to manage and administer the school system, adopted the
following policies, which are deemed to be a part of "established policy and practice" within the meaning of the definition of "grievance" contained in Section A,
Article VII, of this agreement to the extent that such definition is otherwise
applicable.
1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10, art. V.
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tween the Superintendent of Schools and the Union on educational matters of mutual interest and concern. This meant that the
Board, while reserving to itself the final decision in these matters,
would permit the Union to press its position in separate discussions
away from the bargaining table. The parties expressed this new consultative role for the Union in a formal declaration included as a
"Preamble" to, but not a part of the substantive terms of, the second
collective bargaining agreement. In the "Preamble," the Board of
Education and the Union "recognize that they have a common responsibility beyond their collective bargaining relationship," and
they "declare their mutual intent to work together toward the
achievement of common aims of educational excellence." For this
purpose, they agreed to "meet and consult" once a month during the
school year "on matters of educational policy and development."
One of the specific subjects of joint consultation was the development of a program for the improvement of "difficult schools."30
A related clash of positions demonstrated another limitation on
the scope of collective bargaining in public education. The Union
demanded that the agreement include specific provisions concerning
the length of the school year, the length of teacher vacations, and related matters, all of which the Board had previously regulated by
means of bylaw. The Board conceded that these matters had a direct
bearing on working conditions but insisted that they were essential
to its discretionary authority to manage the school system and hence
could not be bargained away for a fixed period. The Union then
sought definite assurance that the existing bylaws would not be
changed during the term of the agreement; accordingly, it asked that
the provisions of the bylaws be incorporated into the contract. The
Board, asserting its continuing legal obligation to govern the school
system according to changing educational needs, refused to yield the
freedom to amend its bylaws when necessary. One salient example
of the need for continued flexibility, the Board suggested, was the
possibility that the school year would have to be lengthened or varied
to make up for lost school time due to teachers' strikes. In the end,
the parties resolved the dispute by narrowing the subjects of controversy to sick leave, sabbatical leaves, vacations, and holidays. The
Board expressly agreed that it would continue its "present policy" as
to these subjects, "except insofar as change is commanded by law." 40
So critical to both sides were the implications of the fundamental
39. 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10.
40. Id. art. XIV.
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issues resolved in the second round of negotiations that a serious
public dispute arose benveen the Board and the Union as to what
the one had yielded and the other had won. The parties met this
threat to the completion of a final agreement by adding to the contract an epilogue entitled "Conclusion." This conclusion, reproduced here in part, provides significant internal evidence of the serious struggle which characterized the second phase of the bargaining
history:
In a field of collective bargaining which presents new and unresolved
problems, the parties have successfully defined the proper area of
interest on the part of the teachers in their rates of pay and conditions of work while providing simultaneously a mechanism for the
teachers through their union to convey to the Board their views
based on their knowledge and experience on matters of educational
policy and professional concern. This agreement provides terms and
conditions for the joint relationship which will redound not only to
the benefit of the Board and teachers but more particularly to the
students as well. At the same time it makes clear that the Board has
complete authority over the policies and administration of the school
system which it exercises under the provisions of law and in the fulfilling of its responsibilities under this agreement. 41
The second agreement, eighteen printed pages longer than its predecessor, was not signed until February 10, 1964.
IV.

THE THIRD STAGE: MATURITY AND UNION POWER

By the early winter of 1965, when negotiations commenced for a
third agreement, collective bargaining had become the accepted technique for determining the salaries and working conditions of New
York City teachers. The grievance procedure had become the principal mechanism for resolving complaints by teachers that they were
not receiving the benefits assured them by the collective bargaining
contract or by established practice. 42 When the grievance process
failed, the Union submitted numerous cases to arbitration for final
and binding decisions by neutral third parties chosen by both sides.43
The process of regular joint consultation on a year-round basis
added a new and broader dimension to the teacher-Board relationship. Through this process the Union became a truly powerful force
41. 1963-65 Agreement, supra note IO.
42. By the end of the school year in June 1965, 285 grievances had been filed at
the last agency step of the grievance procedure.
43. Twenty cases were taken to arbitration by the end of the school year in June
1965.
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in school administration. The earliest product of joint consultation
was the completion, through a joint committee, of the "More
Effective Schools Plan" (MES), which was put into operation in a
few schools on an experimental basis.44 As a further aspect of the
Union's new role in administrative and policy matters, it participated
in planning the Board's internal procedures for administering the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, it appeared before school administrators and Board committees on the
issuance of new licenses, the creation of new positions in the schools,
and other matters of educational import. During this period the
Union also awoke to its responsibility to enforce that provision of the
contract under which the Board undertook to make no changes with
respect to "matters not covered by this agreement which are proper
subjects for collective bargaining" without "appropriate prior consultation and negotiation with the Union." 45 On several occasions, the
Board withdrew items appearing on the calendar for action at a
public meeting upon the Union's insistence that the matter was a
proper subject for collective bargaining and that "prior consultation
and negotiation" had not taken place.46
In the negotiations for a third agreement, the Union fared well
in its salary demands and in obtaining other benefits for the teachers.
Thus, the third contract made benefits less conditional on budgetary
limitations. It afforded regular substitute teachers, 47 who had limited
rights under law and a tenuous hold on their employment, rights of
assignment under uniform and objective procedures and a reasonable measure of job security. Moreover, the new contract accorded regularly appointed teachers, generally unable to transfer to
another school except through personal arrangements, the benefits
of a transfer plan based on reasonable standards to be uniformly
applied. It made the grievance procedure less formal, and opened
recourse to arbitration for some complaints based upon policy provi44. See text accompanying notes 71-77 supra.
45. 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10, art. XIV.
46. An example of an item withdrawn from a public calendar upon protest by
the Union at a public meeting was a proposed resolution for commencing the 1966-67
school year two days earlier than usual and requiring teachers to report for duty two
days earlier than in prior years. The Union claimed that the proposal would, in
fact, shorten the summer vacation of teachers and hence would violate that part of
the agreement in which the Board undertook "to continue its present policy with
respect to ••• vacations." See text accompanying note 40 supra. The Board took the
position that its interpretation of the language in question permitted the proposed
action. It asked the Union to take the matter to arbitration under the grievance
procedure. The Union refused and threatened to keep the teachers out of school on
the two days of proposed early reporting. The Board subsequently abandoned the
proposal.
47. These teachers constituted about one-third of the teaching staff.
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sions of the agreement. In addition, the contract expanded the classroom teacher unit for which the Union had obtained recognition to
include those who served in part-time teaching programs conducted
by the Board. 48
But much more was at stake in the third set of negotiations than
just wages and teacher benefits. The new theme in forging the third
agreement was enhancement of the Union's status in the schools and
in the school system. By now the Union was representing more than
45,000 teachers in the day-school system, and thousands among them
who were serving in additional part-time assignments, as well as
other units of collateral pedagogical employees.49 The Union was
seeking security for itself as an organization; it wanted the prestige
and power which would attract and retain a growing membership.
Accordingly, it asked the Board for the favored treatment that would
give it that prestige and power. In short, the Union was seeking some
of the incidents and advantages of exclusive representation which
were already commonplace in private employment but which had
not been completely accepted in the public sector. In part, this difference between the public and private sectors was due to conflict between the principles of the merit system and the closed shop or union
shop. 110 In part, it was due to the generally recognized obligation
upon government to spend public money only for public purposes.
In its earlier agreements, the Union had obtained some of the
more common privileges attendant upon exclusive bargaining status.
48. The broadened unit included, in addition to all classroom teachers in the
regular day school instructional program, "all those employed as per session teachers."
1965-1967 Agreement, supra note 11, art. I. The new grouping, among whom the
Union had established majority representation, was composed of all those who were
employed as teachers in one or more of the numerous after-school, evening, and
summer programs conducted by the Board of Education.
The designation of "per session" teacher derives from the fact that each work
period, consisting of a stated number of hours, is known as a "session," for which
teachers are paid a "per session" rate. Except for a small number of teachers in summer day camps and in evening adult classes, the per session assignments are held by
day school teachers. At the time of the third agreement, a number of these teachers
were multiple per session jobholders filling after-school, evening, and su=er positions. The Board pondered the wisdom of extending bargaining rights for these extra
jobs and then decided to treat the group as though they were separate, regularly
employed, part-time workers. The Board was thus involved in negotiating separate
sets of working conditions for the same employees-as though they were in fact different persons than those employed in the day schools.
49. Attendance teachers, psychologists and social workers, school secretaries,
guidance counselors, and laboratory assistants-totaling approximately 4,000 employees
as of that time.
50. The Federal government's position was clearly stated in PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE,
supra note 22, at 25:
The Task Force wishes to state its emphatic opinion that the union shop and the
closed shop are contrary to the civil service concept upon which Federal employment is based, and are completely inappropriate to the Federal service.
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Thus, it had obtained the exclusive use of at least one bulletin board
in each school "for purposes of posting material dealing with proper
and legitimate Union business." 51 The Board had accorded a limited
number of leaves of absence without pay but with service credit for
salary increment and retirement purposes to teachers who were officers or staff members of the Union. 52 While union activity on working
time was prohibited, the Board had assured members of the Union's
negotiating committee and its special consultants that they would
be excused "without loss of pay" for working time spent in negotiations with the Board or its representatives. 53 At the individual school
level, organized by the Union as a "chapter," prior agreements had
granted the following perquisites of exclusive bargaining status:
chapter chairmen were allowed "reasonable time during school
hours" to investigate grievances; 54 meetings of the school chapte1
were permitted within the school "under circumstances which will
not interfere with the instructional program"; 55 and the principal of
the school was required to meet with the chapter committee once a
month during the school year "to consult on matters of school policy
and on questions relating to the implementation of this agreement."56
In the third round of negotiations, the Union did not demand
any of the conventional union security clauses. 57 It sought the
following forms of special treatment: First, it wanted the Board
51. This provision was contained in both of the previous agreements. 1962-1963
Agreement, supra note 3, art. X; 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10, art. X.
52. This provision was also contained in both of the previous agreements. 1962-1963
Agreement, supra note 3, art. VIII; 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10, art. VIII.
53. 1962-1963 Agreement, supra note 3, art. VII; 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note
10, art. II.
54. 1962-1963 Agreement, supra note 3, art. VI, § B(8); 1963-1965 Agreement, supra
note 10, art. VI, § B(8).
55. This provision was not contained in the first agreement covering the 1962-1963
school year, but was incorporated into the second contract, 1963-1965 Agreement,
supra note 10, art. XI.
56. This provision was first added in the second contract covering the 1963-1964
and 1964-1965 school years, 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10, art. XII.
57. Nor could it ask for the right of exclusive representation of all teachers in the
unit in grievance prosecution and arbitration. Special legislation pertaining only to
teachers, enacted by the state legislature in 1964 and presumably still in effect, had
vitiated the exclusive representation right for grievance prosecution which had been
given to the Union in prior agreements. This was accomplished by means of language
stating that the representative of "the public school teacher" in the presentation of
his grievance "shall be designated by the public school teacher at the time he presents
his grievance or at a subsequent date." GEN. MuN1c. LAW, § 603-a (McKinney 1965).
The legislation was directed at a prior decision of the State Commissioner of Education that upheld the Union's exclusive right, as against any minority organization,
to represent teachers under the grievance procedure prescribed in the first agreement.
Matter of City Teachers Association of New York, Decision No. 7262 (Aug. 13, 1963).
Hence, a teacher-grievant may select a minority organization to represent him in
pursuit of the benefits negotiated in the agreement by the exclusive bargaining agent.
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to abolish completely an established professional employee organization-the Policy Consultation Council-with which the Board had
consulted for many years on various matters of educational and
school policy. The Council was part of a Staff Relations Plan issued
by the Board in 1956 following consultation with employee organizations and professional groups. In some structural respects, the
Council resembled some of the company-devised employee representation plans encountered in private industry at an earlier time.
The Union, insistent upon becoming the sole voice for teachers on
matters of educational policy at the individual school level, also
asked for the abolition of the Staff Relations Committees-the organs of the Staff Relations Plan at the individual schools. Such
groups, the Union argued, were a threat to its exclusive bargaining
status and should no longer be permitted to exist alongside a collective bargaining representative; even if, as the Board maintained,
these groups were purged of all negotiating and grievance functions,
they were still anachronisms whose survival could not be justified.
The Union also sought favored status for the chapter chairman at
each school. It asked the Board to make the office more attractive by
arranging a lighter program of school duties for the chapter chairman
in order to allow him more time during the school day for the tasks of
his union office. Finally, and most significantly, the Union wished to
administer unilaterally a welfare fund to which the Board was the
sole contributor.
The Union won each of these demands either entirely or to a
substantial degree. It won them on the theory that the privileges
were an accepted perquisite of exclusive representation and that they
would promote a stable and responsible collective bargaining relationship in the school system. The third agreement expressly
stripped the Policy Consultation Council of all functions, and the
Board undertook to adopt an appropriate resolution for its disestablishment."58 The Staff Relations Committees were to be discontinued in any school where, as evidenced by valid check-off authorizations,59 a majority of the faculty were members of the Union.
Moreover, the agreement granted to chapter chairmen a stated num58. The supervisors were the dominant groups remaining in the Policy Consultation Council at that time. However, they had already formed another organization,
the Council of Supervisory Associations (CSA), composed of constituent organizations
of supervisors at various levels of authority. On May 5, 1965, in a joint "Memorandum
of Agreement," the Board recognized the CSA as the exclusive representative of all
supervisors eligible for membership in each of its constituent organizations and agreed
to meet and consult with it "on matters of educational policy and development" and
on the working conditions, salary schedules, and grievances of the supervisors.
59. The job was finished in the next agreement, when all remaining Staff Relations Committees were abolished.
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ber of duty-free periods during the week for handling grievances and
union business. The Union also acquired two additional leaves of
absence for its teacher-officers or staff members.
But the grant of authority to administer unilaterally a welfare fund
consisting entirely of Board contributions was the most unexpected
concession to the Union. Welfare benefits were granted for the first
time in the third agreement. That agreement stipulated that the
Board would provide funds at the rate of 100 dollars per teacher per
year during the first year of the agreement, and at the rate of 140
dollars per year during the second year, prorated on a monthly basis
"for the purpose of making available for each day school teacher" supplemental welfare benefits "under a plan to be devised and established jointly by representatives of the Union and of the Board." 60
The details of the plan were to be left to later negotiation. The
Board had earlier informed the Union of its intention to establish a
welfare fund to be jointly administered under a plan whereby both
sides would appoint trustees in a manner similar to the requirements
of federal law for welfare funds in private industry. 61 Such a plan
would have been modeled after the administration of the welfare
fund for employees of the City Transit Authority, an autonomous
agency established for the City of New York by state law. After accepting the Board's earlier proposal, however, the Union learned
that the New York City government had approved a standard welfare fund arrangement with unions representing its employees which
provided for unilateral union administration and management.
The United Federation of Teachers then insisted upon the City's
standard unilateral arrangement. The Board, concerned about
the public policy and legal aspects of the payments and of the
unilateral union administration of the fund, sought the opinion
of the New York City Corporation Counsel. The Corporation
Counsel advised early in 1966 that the Board's contributions to
the proposed welfare fund were for a proper public purpose and that
the proposed arrangement for unilateral administration would not
violate the Board's fiduciary responsibility in the expenditure of
public monies. The Board thereupon entered into a supplemental
agreement with the Union requiring it to pay into the "United Federation of Teachers Welfare Fund" 62 the amounts specified in the
third basic contract. The supplemental agreement provided that
"the Fund shall be administered and managed by five Trustees, who
shall be appointed by the Administrative Committee of the Union."
60. 1965-1967 Agreement, supra note 11, art. III, § E(2).
61. Welfare&: Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1964).
62. Hereinafter referred to as the "UFT Welfare Fund" or the "Fund."
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The Union anticipated that the Board's contributions to the Fund
during the term of the new agreement would reach a rate of eight
million dollars per year for all units which it represented.
The strict accounting, auditing, and reporting requirements of
this welfare-fund agreement, its controls on administration, and its
emphasis on the fiduciary responsibilities of trustees afforded reasonable assurance against misuse of Board contributions. Thus, the
Union's power did not turn on mere control over the disposition
of large sums of money. The important thing was that new and
highly valuable benefits were available to teachers through an administrative facility designated as "the United Federation of Teachers
Welfare Fund." This undoubtedly afforded the Union the greater
measure of prestige and power which it needed to gain and retain
substantial numbers of new members. 63
·
While the benefits were expressly available under the collective
bargaining agreement to all employees in the unit without regard
to their membership in the Union, there is reason to assume that
the impression was nevertheless created that membership was either
a condition precedent to receipt of benefits or an advantage in their
dispensation. The fact that the Fund was designated as the "United
Federation of Teachers Welfare Fund" might reasonably have led
the uninformed to suppose that the Union was actually expending
its own money and hence would limit its largesse to its members. The
Union's simultaneous grant of additional benefits from its own funds
to union members only might well have heightened the confusion.
Even those who understood that the Board provided the contributions to the "UFT Welfare Fund" might still have been uncertain as
to whether nonmembers were intended beneficiaries; nor would it be
unreasonable for them to assume that the disbursement of Board
funds controlled by the Union might tend to favor union members.
The Union's administration of the Fund at the school level tended
to strengthen the association in some teachers' minds between eligibility for welfare benefits and union membership. Thus, the chapter
chairmen at the individual schools were the sole distributors of
benefit application and fund enrollment forms. Employees complained to the Board of Education that the chapter chairmen in
some schools gave the necessary forms only to union members.
63. For a discussion of the importance of this Fund to the Union, see Foreword,
Message from the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, in Health and Welfare Benefits
(published and distributed to New York City Schools by the Union): "New
York City teachers are justly proud in the achievement represented by the United
Federation of Teachers Welfare Fund. The United Federation of Teachers Welfare
Fund is an historic first. It is the first teacher welfare fund in the history of American
education."
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Schools having no union members, and hence no chapter chairman,
were overlooked initially. Moreover, chapter chairmen were responsible for distributing literature on welfare-fund benefits, initially to all employees in each school and then regularly to new employees. Those unaccustomed to careful textual scrutiny may well
have wondered whether union membership was not a condition of
access to the valuable coverage described in the publications. The
lack of clarity stemmed from the language of the basic booklet,
which was entitled "Health and Welfare Benefits" and subtitled
"For members of the fund and their families/UFT Welfare Fund."
In its opening statement, the booklet asserted that all employees for
whom the Board contributes money to the "UFT Welfare Fund, are
hereinafter referred to interchangeably as 'covered employees', members of the Fund, or members." While the term "members" was thus
technically tied to the Fund, its usage in connection with the availability of particular benefits may have led some teachers to believe
that the term referred to union membership. 64 Although the Board
brought to the Union's attention complaints by nonmembers of
their disparate treatment by chapter chairmen, and even though
the Union investigated and corrected instances of discriminatory
action, it can scarcely be denied that the Union retained a fundamental advantage in its unilateral administration of the welfare
fund. Indeed, the October 7, 1966, issue of the Union's official
publication reported a "startling jump" in membership in the first
month of the new school year. 65

v.

THE FOURTH STAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC-INTEREST
ISSUES PECULIAR TO THE ENTERPRISE

The negotiations for the fourth, and current, agreement between
the teachers and the Board emphasized the fundamental importance
of the public-interest factor in public employment bargaining. Two
basic components of the public-interest factor had, of course, appeared in earlier negotiating encounters: setting priorities among
64. As an example of the later carry-over of the special term "member" to other
literature, several statements in the Fund News (published and distributed to all
schools in February 1968) explained that new benefits made possible by the fourth
agreement with the Board would be granted to "our eligible members," or to "members,'' or to "the eligible employee-member." The Board received a number of in•
quiries from some employees seeking clarification of eligibility for the benefits and
from others complaining of the exclusion of nonmembers of the UFT from the new
benefits.
65. United Federation of Teachers, UNITED TEACHER. Other issues showed that
membership increased by 8,000 from September of the first year of the third agreement
to December of its second year.
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competing demands upon available Board funds for the administration of educational programs and the general operation of the school
system; and separating the realm of wages, hours, and working conditions from the domain of governmental policy and public management.
'
The first public-interest component concerns the public agency's
judgment as to what part of its total budget it can conscientiously
commit to employee gains and benefits consistent with the public interest. In collective bargaining on economic demands-wages, fringe
benefits, and working conditions-the Board has repeatedly asserted
that its first concern in the fiduciary allocation of public funds must
be the "good of the children." The Union's typical reply has been:
"Teachers want what children need." In the end, the public has acquiesced in the final budgetary allocations for teacher gains and benefits-an acceptance based either on the perceived value of economic
benefits as forces in educational improvement or on their worth in
avoiding the educational and social hazards of a deferred school
opening.
The second public-interest component is more fundamental:
how can bilateral collective bargaining be limited in scope to matters directly affecting the employment relationship? How can it be
kept from intruding upon the essential mission of a governmental
agency such as the Board of Education, which has been entrusted
with a nondelegable duty to design and operate an educational system
in the public interest? As noted earlier, the precise scope of collective
bargaining has not been easy to define. Previous differences have
been resolved when the Union withdrew certain items from the bargaining table, when the Board ceded some of its authority in twilight-zone disputes, or when the parties devised other mechanisms of
union participation, such as consultation and discussion. It was during the negotiations for the fourth agreement, however, that the
sharpest and most stubborn public-interest conflicts emerged.
By the winter of 1967, the Board and parent and community
groups had become persuaded that the improved working conditions
granted to teachers in past agreements had impeded the attainment
of higher educational goals for children. At the center of their concern were the children in the "special service schools" located in the
low socio-economic areas of the city. For these children, learning
sights and educational achievements were concededly low. The
Board was convinced that the interaction of three factors-a ge1_1eral
teacher shortage, inability to recruit a conscientious career staff, and
unrealistic working conditions prescribed by prior collective bargain-
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ing agreements--was hampering its efforts to provide a better education where it was needed most. In order to attract competent and experienced teachers to special service schools and retain them there,
the Board had previously agreed with the Union to reduce the
amount of teaching time required of teachers during their six and
one-third hours of daily attendance in those schools; it had correspondingly increased the number of preparation periods. The third
agreement had granted to teachers in the special service elementary
schools two additional preparation periods per week (for a total of
four) during which they were relieved of teaching duties and were
expected to devote themselves to unsupervised and unassigned professional tasks. In the special service junior high schools, the Board
reduced teaching time from twenty-four to twenty-two forty-five
minute periods per week and increased preparation periods from
six to eight per week. Three other provisions of past agreements also
contributed to the Board's dilemma: the increase in the number and
succession of paid sick-leave days for regular and substitute teachers
for which no authenticating physician's certificate was required; the
commitment to relieve teachers of teaching duties during preparation periods--except in an "emergency"; and the agreement to give
teachers general control over the use of their preparation periods.
The practical impact of these four categories of improved working conditions on the education of children in special service schools
became evident during the second year of the third agreement. The
effect of the reduction in teaching time was to require the Board to
increase the number of teachers in each school at a rate sufficient
to provide each child with a full day's instruction. This meant
recruiting several thousand new teachers. The system's experienced
teachers did not find the lighter teaching schedules a sufficient inducement to lure them into the special service schools. Hence, the
Board had to tap whatever sources of new teachers were available
outside the school system. The tremendous expansion in staff
brought to many special service schools untried and unseasoned recruits as well as a large number of casual or transient substitutes unwilling or unprepared to qualify for regular appointment. At best,
the staffs which were recruited for these schools were often inadequate to the educational challenges presented. Nor was there any
time during nonteaching periods which the Board could utilize for
sustained teacher training and orientation. Still worse, the comparative rate of staff absenteeism for alleged illness increased markedly in
these schools--particularly on the days preceding and following
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week-ends and holidays. If the principal exhausted the roster of
neighborhood substitute teachers willing to "fill in" on a daily basis,
he was forced to assign other teachers in the school to "cover" the
teacherless class. For the children, the excessive absences meant intermittent breaks in the continuity of their badly needed instruction.
For the teachers who were required to "cover" the teacherless class,
it meant the reluctant surrender of one or more highly prized
preparation periods. 66 Faced with these consequences, the Board became convinced that the four types of teacher benefits negotiated in
the third contract were in fact educationally unprofitable and that
their monetary cost could be put to substantial productive use if
diverted to other needs of the system. Accordingly, it appeared to
the Board that a return to pre-existing conditions and the introduction of new restrictions might be a partial answer to its dilemma.
To achieve its own goals and to meet the objections of parent
groups, the Board prepared a set of demands incorporating proposals
for changes in the new agreement which would, among other things:
(1) increase the number of teaching periods and reduce the number
of preparation periods in the special service elementary and junior
high schools; (2) reduce the number and succession of paid sick-leave
days for which no authenticating physician's certificate was required;
(3) revise the transfer plan to encourage transfers of experienced
teachers to schools having a low experience index; (4) require teachers to attend training and orientation courses after school hours and
during their preparation periods; and (5) favor the novice teacher
with less difficult class assignments. The Union, on the other hand,
sought a further reduction in teaching time at all levels and an expansion in the number of nonteaching preparation and professional
periods,67 such nonteaching time to be used at the complete discretion of the teacher. As compensation for loss of preparation
periods because of teacherless classes, or for any other reason, the
Union requested the Board to contribute to the welfare fund "at
twice the maximum hourly per session rate for the time lost."
Moreover, the Union wanted five additional days of paid sick-leave
allowance and the complete abolition of the need for an au66. While teacher grievances on loss of preparation periods for class coverage were
not sustained because of the "emergency" nature of the assignment, an arbitrator
nevertheless observed that a continuing state of emergency due to teacher shortage
might not be a valid defense to excessive class coverages. He suggested better planning
for recruitment.
67. The "professional" period is a period in which the teacher is relieved of an
administrative assignment, as differentiated from a "preparation" period in which the
relief is from teaching duties.
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thenticating physician's certificate. It also sought five additional days
per year of paid leave for "personal business."
The clash of positions on these and other public-interest issues
remained persistently intractable through three separate phases of
mediation efforts conducted successively during the period following
expiration of the third agreement on June 30, 1967.68 Among the
public-interest differences were two which proved to be particularly
divisive: the problem of the so-called "disruptive" pupil and the
controversy over the More Effective Schools program (MES). The
conflict over these issues illustrated again how difficult it is to separate the realm of collective bargaining from the domain of governmental policy-making, and how delicate the balance is between
the pull of public-interest concerns and the force of special group
demands.
The Union submitted for incorporation in the fourth agreement
a new section entitled "A Program To Remove Disruptive Children
from Regular Classrooms." The proposal consisted of three subsections, which respectively recited the objectives of the program, set
forth procedures for the effectuation of those objectives, and defined
the role of the Union and the specific responsibilities of the Board
to the Union. The principal objective was to vest in the classroom
teacher a major share of the discretion to decide whether a child's
behavior was so "disruptive" as to warrant his transfer from a regular classroom to other facilities more "appropriate" to his educational needs. The subsection on procedure began with the statement,
"A teacher may exclude from his class a child whose behavior is causing serious disruption in the classroom." It then set forth the following three grounds for the exclusion of a "disruptive" child: (1) "Endangering the health and/ or safety of (himself and) other children
(e.g., fighting, smoking)"; (2) "Intimidation of the teacher and/or
fellow students"; and (3) "Inciting to violence." Finally, the subsection described the steps to be pursued following a child's exclusion
from the classroom. These steps included a report by the teacher and
a conference between the teacher and members of the school's behavioral and supervisory staff to plan the necessary remedial measures.
The subsection called for an interview with the child and
a meeting with his parents, both in the presence of the teacher.
It also prescribed mandatory remedies of permanent removal from
the teacher's class or of suspension from the school under specified
68. The Union submitted altogether 670 demands on which over 100 negotiating
sessions had been held by the expiration of the agreement on June 30, 1967; by
then, an accord had been reached on only a few items.
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circumstances. The teacher was to have the right "to be accompanied
by a United Federation of Teachers representative through all phases
of this procedure." 69
The Union's policy justification for the demand was that the behavior of disruptive children in some of the city's "difficult" schools
so seriously undermined the stability of the normal classroom situation as to make it almost impossible for the teacher to teach and
for other children to learn. The Union's explanation for placing the
subject on the bargaining agenda was that violence and threats of violence by pupils against fellow-students and teachers, as well as other
types of unmanageable pupil conduct, were so widespread as to affect
seriously the working conditions of teachers. The Union claimed
that the Board had no effective central policy for dealing with the
plight of the teachers and that school administrators were consequently unwilling to remove disruptive pupils from regular classrooms and place them in other facilities. The Union saw the teacher
as the victim of a grave injustice against which he had no recourse
and no effective remedy. Hence, the Union sought to negotiate both
the procedure of the recourse and the substance of the remedy; in
so doing, it placed the greatest emphasis upon the teacher's right to
take the initial self-help step himself and then to participate in all
phases of the decision on the ultimate outcome. 70
To the Board, the proper placement of the disruptive child in
the school system was a matter of educational policy. And the role
of educational policy maker, the Board insisted, could not be ceded
to an individual teacher or to an outside body. Moreover, the
Board did not share the Union's view that the teacher was necessarily an innocent victim of antisocial pupil habits in the classroom.
The Board suggested that a poor or inexperienced teacher might well
generate disruptive behavior because of inability to establish the relationships with pupils necessary to command their respect and retain attention. Parent groups shared the Board's views and foresaw
in the Union's plan the possibility of placing in the hands of weak
or hostile teachers the power to determine the educational fate of
children already in need of intensive instructional care. As the negotiations reached the second mediation phase, the Board offered to
prepare, in consultation with the Union, a Superintendent's circular
69. The Union's proposal was a modified version of a provision obtained by its
sister American Federation of Teachers Local in Detroit, Michigan, in the latter's
1966-1967 collective bargaining agreement.
70. The dispute was essentially over the so-called unmanageable or disruptive
child, as distinguished from the pupil who engages in acts of violence against the
teacher or a fellow student. The Board had a definite policy covering acts of violence.
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for school administrators which would establish appropriate procedures for handling serious student behavior problems. The Board was
not willing, however, to make the circular or its procedures contractually binding. For its part, the Union indicated a willingness
to have an outside panel on which the Union would be represented
make the final decision on the disposition of the pupil, but it stood
firm in its demand to negotiate the procedures and include them in
the agreement.
A similar stalemate developed around the MES program.71 The
Board had adopted the program in 1964 for a limited number of
elementary schools as an experiment in elevating pupil achievement
levels in slum areas through changes in school organization and
structure. Briefly stated, the salient features of the plan for each
school included: a relatively small total number of pupils, reduced
class sizes, an increased ratio of classroom teachers and guidance
counselors to pupils, additional small-group instruction, increased
funds for educational materials and school supplies, and frequent
consultation between faculty and administrators on teaching and
supervision goals and techniques. Moreover, each school was to have
on its staff a full-time team of experts in pupil-personnel servicespsychologist, social worker, attendance teacher, speech therapist, and
community coordinator. Apart from the obvious improvements in
working conditions afforded teachers by the experimental MES design, the plan offered them additional advantages in the form of
more preparation periods, freedom from secretarial tasks, freedom
from nonteaching duties, and the ability to hold conferences during
school hours. The Union regarded itself as the real architect of the
fundamental design of the plan. It had looked upon the plan as the
best "school-by-school approach to the problem of providing schools
which can really educate children in spite of any environmental
handicaps they may bring to school with them." 72 It also viewed the
plan as a model for other city school systems faced with the challenge of achieving academic and social progress for their children.
As noted above, the Union had in 1963 insisted upon placing its
proposals for the improvement of "difficult" schools on the bargaining table. 73 The Board's position at that time was that the subject
was not within the ambit of collective bargaining. The parties re71. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
72. See AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,

EFFECTIVE SCHOOLS FOR ALL CHILDREN

(1964); AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, THE MORE EFFECTIVE SCHOOLS PROGRAM IN
NEW YORK CITY (1964).

73. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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solved the dispute through the mechanism of a "Preamble" to the
agreement which provided for regular joint consultation sessions between the Union and the Superintendent of Schools. The MES program grew out of those joint consultations.
·
Twenty-one MES program schools were in operation when the
parties began their negotiations for a fourth agreement. Now the
Union asked that "every elementary school located in a ghetto or
disadvantaged area of the City shall be made a More Effective
School." This would mean the reorganization of about 300 elementary schools in accordance with the MES plan. The Union also
sought from the Board a definite contractual commitment in behalf
of the expanded program, together with assurances that the Board
would not modify the elements of the program without the concurrence of the Union. While not unaware of the substantial improvements in working conditions that would inure to teachers from expansion of the plan, the Board saw the fundamental issue as one of
educational policy affecting children-an area of decision-making in
which parents and the community had the greater stake. The Board
consequently took the position that the bargaining process was not
the appropriate technique for formulating educational programs of
this type, and that a collective bargaining agreement was not the
suitable medium for recording them. Moreover, although cognizant
of the Union's commitment to MES as its special professional contribution in the search for an answer to the ghetto school problem,
the Board was not convinced that the twenty-one-school experiment
was demonstrating its cost effectiveness. In the Board's view, other
Board-instituted programs aimed at developing the learning abilities
of children in the early school years held greater promise for a
larger number of children at a lower comparative cost. As the
negotiations ground through the second mediation phase, the Board
indicated its willingness to assure the Union that it would not
reduce the number of schools then involved in the MES program,
and that it would not modify the elements of the existing programs
without prior consultation with the Union.
A special mediation panel named by Mayor Lindsay74 attempted
from mid-August to one week before the opening of school in September to provide a basis for a peaceful resolution of the critical
public-interest issues still in dispute: teaching time, preparation
time and its use, teacher training, absence allowances, the disruptive
pupil, and MES. In its report to the Mayor on September 4, 1967,
74. The panel was composed of Professor Archibald Cox, chairman, Professor
Walter Gellhom, and Dean Russell D. Niles.
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the panel made the following recommendations as to all matters
other than the disruptive pupil and MES:
(1) The number of preparation and other nonteaching professional periods should remain unchanged.
(2) The assignment of a teacher to "cover" a teacherless class
should be recognized as a proper "emergency" measure provided that compensatory time be given for preparation periods (beyond a stated minimum) lost by reason of such assignment.
(3) Preparation time and other professional nonteaching time
should be subject generally to the teacher's control, except
that a new teacher without prior professional experience
could be directed during his first year of employment to
devote "a reasonable number of his preparation periods, not
to exceed twenty, to observing classes conducted by more
experienced teachers or to consulting others familiar with
classroom problems."
(4) The existing sick leave provisions should remain in effect
pending agreement on a new kind of leave plan proposed in
the report. This new plan, the panel suggested, would not
only reduce the opportunity for abuse and encourage the
provident utilization of paid leave allowances, but would
also eliminate a physician's authenticating certificate in most
instances.
(5) A new teacher without prior professional experience could
be favored in classroom assignments and could be directed
by the Superintendent of Schools to participate in an afterschool training program for a specified number of hours during the year.
(6) The teacher-transfer plan should be revised to take into account a better distribution of the more experienced teachers.
As to the disruptive pupil and MES, the mediation panel reported that, because of the complexity of the issues and the unusual
and serious social considerations involved, it would be unwise to
attempt to resolve the disputes "as part of crisis negotiations over
the more conventional terms of a labor contract." The panel proposed, therefore, that each of the issues be settled on an interim
procedural basis which, without prejudicing the rights of either
party, would allow for continued study over a period of time by
experts as well as by such interested persons as parents and other
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groups who "cannot share in labor negotiations." The mediators
contemplated as an interim procedural device the establishment of
two separate special advisory committees composed of representatives of the Union, the Board, and the Mayor. These special committees would study separately the disruptive pupil and MES problems, consult with interested persons, and from time to time make
recommendations to the Board. The panel noted that under this
kind of interim disposition, the Union would not surrender any collective bargaining rights if, in the end, it were dissatisfied with the
committees' proposals as to either of the matters under study.
On September 6, 1967, the Board accepted the mediators' report
and prepared, as its last offer, a proposed new agreement incorporating the panel's recommendations. On September 10, the eve of the
scheduled opening of schools, the Union membership rejected the
Board's offer after the Union's officials had also turned it down.
From September 11 to September 28, when the membership ratified
the final proposed agreement, the City experienced the longest
teacher strike in its history as of that time. 75 During the strike, the
parties conducted further negotiations within the framework of the
mediation panel's recommendations and under the watchful eye of
the Mayor and two other mediators designated by him. The number of public-interest issues was reduced somewhat by agreement or
by modification or withdrawal. The Union's position had now hardened around the following last-ditch residue of its earlier demands: (I) an additional preparation period per week in the special
service elementary schools; (2) additional sick leave allowances and
elimination of the need for a physician's authentication; (3) utilization of the nonteaching professional period in the junior high and
high schools at the teacher's discretion; (4) specified procedures for
handling the "disruptive" pupil; and (5) expansion of the MES
program by contractual commitment.
In the end, a settlement was reached in which the Union
achieved most of its final substantive demands directly affecting
teacher working conditions, and the Board abandoned or modified
its original stance in those areas. Thus, the Union won its fifth preparation period in the special service elementary schools, effective as
of the second year of the agreement. But it yielded to the Board's
75. Six United Federation of Teachers units of pedagogical employees other than
classroom teachers were also involved in the negotiations and in the strike. They were
school secretaries, guidance counselors, psychologists and social workers, attendance
teachers, laboratory assistants, and auxiliary (bi-lingual) teachers. Because each of
these units had its own special interests, separate negotiations were conducted for
each of them. This Article has considered only the classroom teacher unit.
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insistence on using preparation periods and after-school time for
training new teachers. The negotiators devised a new sick-leave plan
under which a physician's certificate was required only after ten
days absence for illness in any school year, as contrasted with the
previous four-day limit. Nonteaching "professional" periods in the
secondary schools were to be used at the teacher's discretion, but
with certain exceptions.
The Board salvaged its position on the disruptive pupil when the
Union agreed that the specific procedures both sides had worked out
in the negotiations be drawn up as a "Special Circular" of the Board
to be appended to, but not made part of, the contract. The special
procedures agreed upon granted the teacher the right to initiate a
complaint regarding a "disruptive" student with the principal of his
school. Thereafter, the teacher could appeal unsatisfactory action to
successively higher levels of administrative authority and to a specially constituted panel of Union, Board, and community representatives. But the final disposition of the case was to be made by the
Superintendent of Schools. At the same time, however, the Board
committed itself by way of a specific undertaking in the agreement
not to change the procedures or policies set forth in the Special Circular without the consent of the Union. The Board also agreed that
the circular would be subject to the grievance procedure and to arbitration only for the purpose of resolving complaints of failure to
comply with the procedures prescribed in the circular-not to review the substance of a decision as to any individual pupil.
The parties resolved the MES issue by incorporating three paragraphs in the Preamble of the agreement. Essentially, these paragraphs
declared that the Board would continue various specified intensive
experimental programs for educational excellence, including MES,
and that it would set aside a fund of 10 million dollars for the 19681969 school year "for the purpose of making further progress in the
development of new programs for the elementary schools." 76 Moreover, a work group headed by an outside eminent educator selected
by the Superintendent and composed of representatives of both sides
and of parent or community groups would make recommendations
to the Board and the Superintendent of Schools for the utilization
of the special fund. However, not less than half the fund was to be
used by the Board "for intensive programs for the reorganization
and improvement of additional schools." 77
76. 1967-1969 Agreement, supra note 12.
77. Id.
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On this basis the Union and the Board concluded the final agreement, and the teachers returned to their classrooms on September 29 for the commencement of the 1967-1968 school year. The
parties and the public then settled down to what they expected to
be a two-year period of quiet enjoyment of the fruits of the bargaining and the new phase of the bargaining relationship. As is well
known, however, before that first year was over, warning signals
were up for the most serious crisis in the history of the school system
and the city community. That account must be left to another
kind of chronicle or perhaps to the next chapter of this history, to
be written when the fifth collective bargaining agreement has been
concluded.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The history of collective bargaining between the New York City
Board of Education and the United Federation of Teachers has
brought into sharp focus the special problems inherent in any effort
to adapt established industrial relations models to the public education enterprise. These problems are compounded when that enterprise is a vast urban school system comprised of large numbers of
children in need of intensive instructional services. Essentially, two
main types of problems and their attendant dilemmas have characterized this particular bargaining history: problems arising out of
demands for so-called "bread and butter" economic items of primary benefit to the teachers-including salaries, fringe benefits, and
improved working conditions; and problems arising out of demands
for bilateral formulation of policies and standards relating directly
to the education of children-ranging all the way from teacher qualifications for particular assignments, to placement of difficult children, to the expenditure of Board funds for experimental educational programs.78
The dilemma presented by the first type of problem has been
how to satisfy teachers' demands for increased salaries while at the
same time meeting other educational and operating school system
needs within budgetary limitations. The solution has often necessitated the reordering of priorities and the diversion of funds intended for other important educational services to teachers' salaries.
While such a course may serve well the expediency of the moment, it
78, See generally Wollett, The Coming Revolution in Public School Management,
67 MICH. L. REY. 1017 (1969).
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places a progressively heavy strain on the Board's ability to fulfill its
fundamental commitment to educational improvement.
The dilemma presented by the second type of problem has been
how to retain in the Board the essential aspects of its public trust
and mission to serve the legitimate interests of the community,
while at the same time satisfying the Union's demands in order to
avoid a deferred commencement of the school year. In this area,
the solutions have been altogether pragmatic, dictated by the relative
force of countervailing pressures at the moment. The result has been
a progressive expansion of the process of joint decision-making to the
point where the Union enjoys equal status with the Board in the
formulation of those aspects of educational management having any
impact, however slight, on teacher welfare or Union prestige. This
has been the outcome even as to policy matters plainly outside the
realm of collective bargaining; as to these matters, there has often
been full bilateral negotiation and agreement even though the final
accord has not actually been incorporated within the physical framework of the contract.
The emergence of these significant characteristics of the relationship between the Board and the Union raises two questions of overriding importance: (1) whether government as an employer can protect its exclusive policy terrain against invasion by the collective bargaining process once that process has been set in motion by a powerful employee representative; and (2) whether the resolution of publicinterest issues in serious collective bargaining clashes can in fact be
guided by the just and proper needs of the public and the community. These are challenges not only for the New York City Board of
Education, but also for governmental employers generally-particularly those entrusted with functions in an area of great social concern.

